This paper provides a model of individual decisionmaking in the presence of neighborhood effects. By neighborhood effects, we refer to interdependencies between individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of others within a common neighborhood. As such, neighborhood effects are forms of social interactions; in fact the terms would seem to be interchangeable in many contexts. Section I outlines a basic choice model with neighborhood effects. Section II specializes the structure using a multinomial logit framework. Section III considers econometric implementation. Section IV discusses some limitations of the framework and proposes some research directions. Proofs of all theorems may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001c).
A Multinomial Choice Model of Neighborhood Effects
This paper provides a model of individual decisionmaking in the presence of neighborhood effects. By neighborhood effects, we refer to interdependencies between individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of others within a common neighborhood. As such, neighborhood effects are forms of social interactions; in fact the terms would seem to be interchangeable in many contexts.
Within economics, there has developed an increasing recognition that neighborhood effects play a possibly major role in explaining a range of individual behaviors; rich empirical and theoretical literatures have developed. A failing of much of this work is the absence of strong connections between theory and empirics. This paper addresses this limitation by providing a model of multinomial choice with neighborhood effects. The model represents a generalization of the binary choice model of William Brock and Steven Durlauf (2001a,b) . The model is econometrically implementable and so has the potential of allowing for structural estimation of neighborhood effects. Section I outlines a basic choice model with neighborhood effects. Section II specializes the structure using a multinomial logit framework. Section III considers econometric implementation. Section IV discusses some limitations of the framework and proposes some research directions. Proofs of all theorems may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001c) .
I. Models of neighborhood effects
We consider I individuals who are members of a common neighborhood. 
where the right hand of this equation is the objective probability measure generated by the model; self-consistency is equivalent to rational expectations in the usual sense. From the perspective of modeling individual behaviors, it is typically assumed that agents do not account for the effect of their choices on the decisions of others via expectations formation. In this sense, this framework embodies an expectations form of a Nash equilibrium.
This generic structure illustrates how neighborhood models can preserve the individual choice-based logic of microeconomics. Their novelty lies in the interdependencies in choices induced by including
µ ω as an argument in individual payoffs and imposing self-consistency.
II. Multinomial choice and neighborhood effects i. basic setup
In order to understand the implications of neighborhood effects for equilibrium behavior, it is necessary to specialize this general behavioral description. We do this in three steps. First, we assume that each agent faces a common choice set with L discrete possibilities, i.e.
. Second, we assume that each choice l produces utility for i according to:
Here, , i l h denotes the deterministic private utility agent i receives from the choice, 
The parameter β measures the dispersion in the random utility terms; higher β implies lower variance. When there are only two choices, this is the model studied in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) . Self-consistency of beliefs for this model requires that
where l p is the objective expected value of the percentage of agents in the neighborhood who choose l and h F is the empirical probability distribution of , i j h . It is straightforward to verify that under the Brouwer fixed point theorem, at least one such fixed point exists.
ii. properties
To understand the properties of this model, it is useful to focus on the special case where , 0 , i l h i l = ∀ . For this special case, the choice probabilities (and hence the expected distribution of choices within a neighborhood) are completely determined by the compound parameter J β .
A primary question is whether and how the presence of interdependencies produces multiple equilibria for the choice probabilities in a neighborhood.
To get some intuition as to how J β affects the number of equilibria, it is useful to consider the extreme cases 0
This equilibrium is also present when J = ∞ . However, others will exist as well. For any pair of choices l and l′ , the associated choice probabilities with a neighborhood always obey
It is immediate that any set of equilibrium probabilities that are bounded away from 0 will become equal as J ⇒ ∞ . This condition is necessary as well as sufficient, so any configuration such that 1
for some subset of b choices and 0
These examples lead naturally to the question of the relationship between J β and changes in the number of equilibria. In order to do this, it is convenient to rewrite (4) and (5) 
where self-consistency imposes e l l m m = . The Jacobian matrix of (7) 
where
is an equilibrium with associated Jacobian matrix elements
< and is an unstable equilibrium otherwise. In turn, if this equilibrium is unstable, then other equilibria must exist; details may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001c) , where the following is proved.
Theorem. Multiple equilibria in the multinomial logit model with neighborhood effects
Suppose that individual choices are characterized by (4) with self-consistent beliefs, i.e., by (5).
Assume that , 0 , 
with ( ) 1 i l ω = denoting the indicator function for the choice of l by agent i . In contrasting this with the probability measure over choices associated with the noncooperative equilibrium (the product of (4) across i ), the key difference is that the social planner's problem uses empirical probabilities in modeling the interdependence of individual choices. This is natural since a planner can account for how the choices of one actor affects others in ways that are ruled out in the noncooperative case. 
The first order necessary conditions for this maximization are such that they produce the same functional form as produced for choice probabilities in the noncooperative model we have described, except that J is replaced by 2J for the planner. The 2 appears because the spillovers flowing from each agent i to others are accounted for by the social planner in contrast to the "Nash noncooperative" equilibrium. Further, the social planner's solution also involves a selection rule when there is more than one set of configurations that are possible equilibria of the noncooperative model. The reason is that the social planner always picks that configuration that maximizes his objective. See Brock (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a) for elaboration.
III. Econometric implementation
An essential justification for the functional form assumptions we have placed on our neighborhood model is that they permit explicit econometric analysis. The multinomial logit property for the individual choices allows one to construct a likelihood function for data taken for individuals across neighborhoods. Since a typical data set will contain observations on individuals in different neighborhoods, we generalize our notation so that ( ) Operationally, it is standard to assume
There is no necessary reason why the same elements of i X and ( ) n i Y should affect the payoff of each choice; one can allow for this by setting particular elements of l c and l d to zero. The likelihood function for a collection of choices ω will therefore be proportional to
subject to the constraints that for each neighborhood ( )
This constraint simply imposes self-consistency in expected choice probabilities across neighborhoods and choices. For technical reasons, it is useful to constrain each agent's information set to ( ) n i Y . As is standard for multinomial logit models, the complete set of model parameters is not identified. It is therefore necessary to impose some normalizations; we follow
Daniel McFadden (1984 McFadden ( , pp.1413 ) and assume 0
As originally recognized in Manski (1993) and further analyzed in Robert Moffitt (2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b) 
Theorem. Identification of the multinomial choice model with neighborhood effects
Let the true data generating process be given by (14)- (15) ( )
The proof of this theorem is involved, and is a generalization of a theorem on identification of neighborhood effects for binary choices found in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b One interesting difference between the binary and multinomial choice cases is that for the multinomial choice case, there may be various zero restrictions on particular elements of , , ,
For example, the direct effect of choice probabilities may be known to be zero for some choices but not for others. However, because the choices are comparative, a regressor that does not directly affect the utility of one choice will nevertheless affect the probability of its selection due to its affect on the utility associated with alternatives. This suggests another route to identification that has yet to be exploited.
IV. Extensions
While our model of multinomial choice with neighborhood effects seems quite rich, an important extension to the model is the endogenizing of neighborhood memberships. As made clear by the theoretical literature, endogenous sorting is an important aspect of the behaviors we wish to model. We believe that a nested logit model in which neighborhoods are first chosen, and with behaviors chosen once the neighborhood memberships are determined can address this limitation to the framework.
Further, as well discussed in Manski (2000) and Moffitt (2001) , endogenous neighborhood choice has important implications for econometric implementation of models of neighborhood effects. Yet endogeneity of neighborhood memberships need not be an impediment to identifying neighborhood effects. Brock and Durlauf (2001b) Our own view is that progress on the empirical analysis of neighborhood effects is most likely achieved through a tight connection between theory and econometrics, and so our current work on these outstanding problems reflects the modeling approach we have described here.
